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cause there was a gift to a third person of the portion of the principal
not consumed by the first taker. On this point the court failed to cite
section 2131.07 of the Ohio Revised Code which reads as follows:
An estate in fee simple may be made defeasible upon the death of
the holder thereof without having conveyed or devised the same, and the
limitation over upon such event shall be a valid future interest. For the
purpose of involuntary alienation, such a defeasible fee is a fee simple
absolute.

Although Charles C. White has stated that this section applies only to
realty,"7 a court today might reasonably construe the word "estate" in the
statute as including an interest in personalty. In fact in the instant case
the court uses the word "estate" as including personalty, with reference to
the legacy of $12,500.
In their recent publication on Future Interests, Professors Simes and
Smith overlooked section 2131.07 of the Ohio Revised Code, though
similar statutes of other states are included.' 8
ROBERT N. COOK

INSURANCE
In Ryland v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co.,l the company had issued
an automobile liability policy to plaintiff upon payment of the first installment of the total annual premium. This first installment amounted
to 40% of the total premium, but the second installment was due two
months later. The policy provided for lapse of company liability upon
failure to pay an installment, and for resumption of liability as of the
date on which a late installment was paid if it was accepted by the company. The plaintiff failed to make the second payment and had an automobile accident for which he was liable. The company refused to defend.
The plaintiff sued to recover the amount of the recovery against him and
for the costs of defending the suit. His clam was that since he had
paid 40% of the annual premium he should be covered for 40% of the
yearly period (which would extent beyond the date of the accident) in
spite of non-payment of the second installment and the lapse clause in
the policy. The plaintiff quoted from a dissenting opinion in Bek v.
Zimmerman in summarizing the crux of his argument: "It would be
contrary to public policy to require a citizen to pay for insurance which
a discussion of this case and other Kentucky cases on the same issue see SRMEs AND
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTEREsTs 1489 (2d ed. 1956).
17
White, Life Estate or Fee?, 6 CIN. L. REV. 429, 447 (1932).
SIMMs AND SMITH, THE LAw OF FuTuRn INTEREsTs § 1491 (2d ed. 1956).
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he does not actually receive."3 The court, however, held for the defendant
because the dear and unambiguous lapse provision was supported by
consideration. Furthermore, the rate schedule was stabilized and the desirability of risk determined. Matters of public policy are primarily
questions for the Legislature. The court in so holding aligned Ohio with
the universal rule on the specific point. Furthermore, it reaffirmed the
basic doctrine about which there has been much debate but no retreat that the relationship between the parties to an insurance policy is governed by principles of general contract law.
In First Nat'l Bank v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.4 the defendant insurance
company granted to plaintiff bank, as owner of a hotel, extended coverage
in a policy of public liability insurance in which the named insured was
plaintiff's lessee, the operating company of the hotel. Suit was filed
against the bank and the lessee for injuries. The defendant insurance
company undertook defense of that suit and answered that the injured
person was an employee of the lessee, and having accepted benefits under
the workmen's compensation laws could not maintain this suit. The injured person demurred and that pleading was sustained. The defendant
then refused to proceed further with the defense and the plaintiff bank
undertook its own defense ultimately becoming successful therein. The
instant suit was brought by the bank to recover the costs of the earlier
defense on the ground that the defendant's withdrawal was a breach of
the insurance contract. A court of appeals held for the plaintiff. The
liability policy required the insurance company to undertake defense of
litigation filed against its insured even though the suit may be successfully defended. The demurrer to the defensive pleading was not an admission of facts which amounted to establishment of a fatal defect in the
plaintiff's position in bringing the earlier suit. It was an admission only
for -the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the facts in law. Consequently, the liability company was not relieved of its defense by the filing
of the demurrer. Its withdrawal was a breach of its contract.
An insurance policy in City Coal & Supply Co. v. American Automobile Ins. Co.5 provided comprehensive coverage for damage to certain
automotive vehides except loss caused by "upset." It was held that no
',upset" occurred when the rear wheels of a truck, while making a delivery to a house under construction, sank into the excavation for the
basement to such an extent that the front wheels were lifted off the ground.
'100 Ohio App. 557, 137 N.E.2d 437 (1955).
*285 Mich. 224, 280 N.W 741 (1938)
'Id. at 238, 280 N.W at 747
' 137 N.E.2d 770 (Ohio App. 1953)
599 Ohio App. 368, 133 N.E.2d 415 (1954)
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It was further held that when the owner of the truck removes it from
the excavation and protects it from further injury, such as the effect of
hardening concrete, he is entitled to reimbursement. The policy provided
that, whether a basic loss was covered by the policy or not, reasonable expense incurred in preventing further injury would be borne by the insurer.
In Umted States Fire Ins. Co. v. Phil-Mar Corp.6 a fire which had
occurred on leased premises was determined to have been caused by
lessee's negligence. The lessor's insurance companies paid the lessor and
sued the lessee for the injuries to the reverson on a daim of subrogation
to the rights of the lessor. To support this claim it was necessary to
establish that .the lessor had a right to proceed against the lessee. The
court recogmzed that the lessee is responsible to the lessor for injuries to
the reversion in the absence of a valid agreement to the contrary. Consequently, recovery depended upon the terms of the leasing agreement. Two
points in the agreement were determinative in the coures mind. First,
the lessee was to pay the difference in any increased insurance premium
occasioned by the new operation carried on by the lessee. This fact, the
court stated, was tantamount "to an understanding between them that the
lessor would maintain adequate fire insurance protection on the property
leased." 7 Second, the surrender clause of the lease provided that the
property would be restored in good condition "loss by fire
excepted."
As it is common knowledge that fire loss in insurance includes that
caused by the negligence of the insured, the court felt that the parties intended that such language in the lease should have a similar meamng.
Consequently, fire loss due to lessee's negligence became the responsibility of the lessor. Since the lessor would have no daim against the
lessee, neither would the insurance compames which had paid him. Their
claim, based on subrogation, could rise no higher than the lessor's.
In Permanent Ins. Co. v.Cox 8 the company had paid its insured under
a fifty dollar deductible policy for damage to his automobile because of
the alleged negligence of defendant. The company then became subrogated to insured's claim to the extent of its payment. Insured brought
suit against the alleged tort-feasor who claimed that the company was the
real party in interest since it had paid the principal part of the claim. A
court of appeals rejected this plea and restated the principle that unless
the insured has been paid in full, he is the real party in interest. The
insurance company is a proper but not a necessary party.
Revised Code section 3911.10 provides, rnter alia, that proceeds from
131 NXE.2d 444 (Ohio App. 1956).
AND TENANT section, infra.
7

This case is also discussed in the LANDLORD

Id. at 446.
'99 Ohio App. 389, 133 N.E.2d 627 (1955).

